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Abstract 
Surprise for a particular event is often thought to correspond to 
the degree to which that event deviates from an expected 
schema. However, in this paper we present two novel 
experiments that challenge this view. Participants were asked to 
rate how surprised they would be if an event, or series of 
events, followed on from a number of short scenarios. In one 
condition these events confirmed an expected outcome, while 
in another they contradicted this outcome. A third condition 
included a potential enabling factor along with the unexpected 
outcome. The results show that, even when events deviate 
significantly from an established schema, surprise is lower if 
people have a means of integrating that event into their 
representation. This finding is consistent with our theory of 
Representation-Fit, which asserts that a person’s level of 
surprise for a given event can be determined by how well that 
event is supported by the prior discourse. 
Keywords: Surprise, expectation, representation, discourse. 
Introduction 
Imagine how you would feel if you walked into your house to 
discover a group of strangers huddled around your dining 
room table playing cards and smoking cigars. Alternatively, 
consider how you might react if you booked your holiday to 
Outer Mongolia, only to bump into your next-door neighbour 
strolling along a deserted mountain path. While such events 
are unlikely to happen to us in real life, we have no difficulty 
in imagining how we would feel if they were to occur: 
essentially, we would be surprised. Surprise is classed as one 
of the most basic and universal of human emotions (Darwin, 
1879; Ekman, 1979), and as well as being associated with a 
distinct subjective and physiological response, it is also 
known to have some important cognitive manifestations (e.g., 
Fisk, 2002; Meyer, Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997; Teigen 
& Keren, 2003). For example, the perception of a surprising 
event will usually cause a person to cease what they are 
currently doing and focus their attention on the event in 
question (Schützwohl and Reisenzein, 1999). The purpose of 
such a reaction is to discover why the surprising event 
transpired, so that a similar event might be anticipated in 
future circumstances.  
While the subjective phenomenon of surprise is well 
established, deciding what counts as a surprising event is a 
more challenging task. Our aim in this article is to shed some 
light on this issue, and more specifically, to assess the claim 
that surprise follows disconfirmed expectations. We also put 
forward an alternative hypothesis: namely, that surprise for a 
given event is based on how well that event can be integrated 
into a person’s discourse representation.  
Probabilities, expectancy and schema-discrepancy 
The most intuitive way of describing a surprise is to say that it 
was unexpected. Likewise, it makes sense to assume that any 
expected event would be unsurprising if it were to occur. 
However, this account can be problematic, mainly due to the 
disagreement surrounding what it means to expect something. 
For instance, if we relate expectations to probabilities, then 
every low probability event should be extremely surprising, 
and vice versa. Evidently however, this is not always the case 
(Shackle, 1969; Teigen & Keren, 2003). Consider a lottery 
draw, where six numbers are selected at random. It is unlikely 
that you would be surprised if the seemingly arbitrary 
selection {3, 7, 15, 18, 24, 37} was drawn, despite the 
extremely low probability of this particular sequence 
occurring. In contrast, if the numbers selected were {1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6}, you would undoubtedly be far more surprised, even 
though this sequence has exactly the same probability of 
occurring as the former. In view of this, Shackle (1969) 
proposed that, rather than defining surprise in terms of actual 
probability, it can be more accurately described as a reflection 
of subjective probability. Hence in the above example, the 
latter combination of numbers has a much lower subjective 
probability of occurring, due to its overtly meaningful pattern. 
On the other hand, we know that some ‘random’ combination 
of numbers is far more typical, making the first sequence 
appear less surprising. This is in line with Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1983) finding that people will often make 
systematic errors in probability judgements if they perceive 
certain events as being more ‘representative’ than others.  
Nevertheless, while a number of studies have found a strong 
correlation between subjective probability and surprise (e.g. 
Fisk, 2002), this relationship is not always quite so 
straightforward. One important difference is that judgements 
of probability are usually given before the event in question, 
whereas surprise is experienced after that event has taken 
place. Studies on hindsight bias have illustrated that people 
will often adjust how likely they thought an event was after 
that event has occurred (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). It follows 
that posing the question “How likely is it to rain today?” 
might elicit a different response to “How surprised are you 
that it rained today?” In light of this, Teigen and Keren 
(2003) suggest that surprise at a given event might be more 
accurately explained in terms of its subsequent comparison 
with an alternative event. Specifically, their Contrast 
Hypothesis maintains that surprise is dependent on the degree 
of disparity between an observed and an expected outcome. 
Investigating this hypothesis, Teigen and Keren (2003) 
carried out an experiment which described Erik, an athlete 
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 competing in a 5,000m race. In one condition, participants 
were informed that Erik was in second place behind a lead 
runner, while in another condition they were told that all the 
athletes, including Erik, had formed one large group as they 
approached the finish line. When asked to indicate how 
surprised they would be if Erik won the race, participants in 
the first condition (where Erik was in second place) gave 
slightly higher surprise ratings than those in the second 
condition (where all the athletes had formed one group), 
despite the fact that participants correctly rated Erik’s 
probability of winning the race as higher in the first 
condition. One explanation for this result is that the first 
scenario induces an expectation (that the lead runner will win 
the race) which is disconfirmed by Erik winning. On the other 
hand, when all the athletes have a chance at winning the race, 
no expectation is contradicted if Erik wins. A similar theory 
was put forward by Meyer et al (1997): their Cognitive-
Psychoevolutionary model proposes that surprise is 
experienced when expectations based on existing schemas 
fail to be confirmed. Surprise is therefore considered as a 
reaction to a schema-discrepant event.  
Henceforth, we will refer to the above theories as 
encapsulating the Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis. 
At first blush, this hypothesis seems intuitive. Consider, for 
example how surprised you would be if you threw a ball up in 
the air and it failed to fall to the ground. This is an extreme 
case of an expectation (i.e., that the ball will drop due to 
gravity) being contradicted. However, it may not always be 
the case that disconfirmed expectations like this lead to such a 
high level of surprise. Other factors in event comprehension, 
in particular the adaptability of one’s existing representation, 
may mitigate the extent of this phenomenon: in short, if a 
person can account for why an expectation was disconfirmed, 
then they might not be so surprised by it. This is the central 
premise of our theory of Representation-Fit, which is outlined 
in more detail below. 
Surprise as representation-fit 
Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) have shown that during 
reading, people routinely construct situation models, or rich 
representations, of the depicted events in a discourse. These 
consist of a number of complex inferences about the central 
characters, their goals and actions, as well as more general 
information about the story’s temporal and spatial context. 
As the reader encounters new events, this representation must 
be continually updated, a process motivated by the need on 
the part of the reader to achieve coherence among the text 
constituents (Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994). 
Accordingly, each new event in a text must be coherently 
integrated into the existing discourse representation for 
successful comprehension to result.  
Based on this premise, Grimes-Maguire and Keane (2005b) 
devised a theory of Representation-Fit for surprise. In short, 
this theory predicts that the more difficult it is for an 
individual to coherently integrate a new event into their 
discourse representation, the more surprising that event will 
appear. As well as being an intuitive view, the underlying 
principles of this theory rest on many well supported models 
of comprehension (e.g. Constructivist theory, Graesser et al, 
1994; Landscape model, Linderholm, Virtue, van den Broek 
& Tzeng, 2004; Situation models, Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998). The main way in which this account differs from 
existing theories of surprise is that it does not view the 
process as being dependent on expectation. Instead surprise is 
conceived as a retrospective judgement relating to how well a 
given event can be connected with those that have preceded 
it, like trying to fit a piece into a jigsaw puzzle. Consider a 
scenario, for instance, where you leave your house to 
discover that your car is no longer in the driveway. This is 
obviously an unexpected, or schema-discrepant, event. 
However, if you remember that you left the car in to be 
serviced yesterday morning, you will be not be so surprised, 
since a satisfactory explanation for this unexpected event has 
been identified. A study conducted by Grimes-Maguire and 
Keane (2005a) offered substantive empirical evidence for this 
perspective. We found that when participants were asked to 
indicate their level of surprise for the end event in a scenario, 
they were extremely adept at detecting subtle differences in 
how strongly that event was supported by the prior discourse. 
We also observed that surprise ratings were not correlated 
with on-line expectations, or forward inferences, arguing 
against the claim that these two variables are linearly related.  
However, while the findings of the above study are in 
accordance with the theory of Representation-Fit, they do not 
necessarily oppose the Expectation-Disconfirmation view 
because no expected outcomes were explicitly disconfirmed 
in the scenarios examined. Consequently, the experiments 
detailed in the current paper investigate the influence of 
representation-fit in cases where the discourse clearly 
contains a schema-discrepant event.  
Overview of experiments 
In the following experiment, we devised a series of event 
sequences that instantiated an expectation for a particular 
outcome. This outcome was subsequently confirmed or 
disconfirmed in two separate conditions. In addition, a third 
condition was included where the disconfirmed outcome was 
presented alongside an enabling factor for that outcome. The 
Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis does not predict that 
surprise ratings will be affected by an enabling factor, as 
these events still contradict the expected sequence of events. 
However, in accordance with the theory of Representation-
Fit, we hypothesised that participants would be less surprised 
when provided with the enabling factor for the disconfirming 
outcome, as this event should facilitate representation 
integration. Experiment 2 examines another potential 
explanation for the observed findings.  
Experiment 1 
In order to explore the Expectation-Disconfirmation 
hypothesis of surprise, a number of event sequences were 
designed that strongly suggested a particular outcome (see 
Table 1 for a sample material). For each of these scenarios, 
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 four hypothetical outcomes were generated, corresponding to 
the following four conditions: 
1. Expectation confirmed (C) described an event that 
corroborated the expected outcome (e.g. in Table 1, the 
alarm clock ringing at 7am supports the expectation that 
is implied by the scenario body).  
2. Expectation disconfirmed (D) described an event that 
contradicted the expected outcome (e.g., the alarm clock 
failing to ring directly opposes the intuitive expectation). 
3. Expectation disconfirmed and enabling event (D+enable) 
described the same disconfirming event as in the 
previous condition alongside a potential enabling factor 
for that event (e.g. a power-cut during the night explains 
why the alarm clock might fail to ring).  
4. Control (D+control) included the same disconfirming 
event as in the latter two conditions in accompaniment 
with an irrelevant event (e.g., a good night’s sleep should 
not influence the functioning of an alarm clock). This 
condition was intended to control for the enabling event 
in the D+enable condition. 
According to the Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis, 
while the C condition should be judged as unsurprising, there 
should be no difference in the surprise ratings given for the 
latter three conditions. This is because all three contradict the 
expected outcome by means of the same disconfirming event. 
In contrast, we hypothesised that surprise ratings would 
follow the trend C < D+enable < D. In line with the 
Representation-Fit perspective, the D+enable condition 
should be perceived as less surprising than the D condition, 
since it offers the reader a rationalisation for why the 
unexpected event might have occurred. This condition should 
therefore be more easily integrated into the discourse 
representation. We did not expect surprise ratings from the D 
condition to differ from the D+control one. 
Method 
Participants Fifty-two undergraduate psychology and maths 
students (all native English speakers) from University College 
Dublin voluntarily participated in this experiment.  
 
Materials Sixteen event sequences describing simple 
everyday scenarios were generated, each of which 
instantiated an expectation that was either confirmed or 
disconfirmed in the four separate conditions as outlined above 
(see Table 1 for an example). 
 
Design The conditions were counterbalanced using four 
different groupings of scenarios and conditions. Each 
participant was presented with one of these groupings which 
contained the 16 scenarios. Participants thus read a total of 
four scenarios from each condition. 
 
Procedure Participants were given a booklet containing the 
16 scenarios, where instructions for the experiment were 
displayed on the first page. Participants were informed that 
they would be presented with a number of everyday scenarios 
and that they should rate how surprised they would be if a 
certain event, or series of events, followed on from that 
scenario. An example was then provided to demonstrate the 
nature of the task. Each scenario body was presented on a 
separate page, followed by the words “How surprised would 
you be if: X”, where X referred to the event, or series of 
events, corresponding to one of the four experimental 
conditions. Participants were required to rate their level of 
surprise for this event on a 7-point scale, with 1 indicating 
that they would be very unsurprised if the event occurred, and 
7 indicating that they would be highly surprised if the event 
occurred. The scenarios were presented in a different random 
order to each participant. 
 
Table 1: Scenario from Experiment 1. All participants read 
the scenario body and rated surprise for one of the four 
conditions. Mean surprise ratings are also displayed. 
 
Scenario body 
Anna has a very important job interview in the morning. 
She has to get up far earlier than usual, so she makes sure to 
set her alarm clock radio for 7am.  
 How surprised would you be if….? Surprise 
1 The alarm clock woke her up at 7am  
  (C) 1.88 
2 The alarm clock failed to ring at 7am  
  (D) 4.95 
3 There was a power-cut during the night 
and the alarm clock failed to ring at 7am  
 
 (D+enable) 4.46 
4 She had a quiet, good night’s sleep and the 
alarm clock failed to ring at 7am 
 
 (D+control) 5.04 
Results & Discussion 
The results support the Representation-Fit account and argue 
against the claim that disconfirmed expectations will 
consistently lead to an equally high level of surprise. When 
participants are provided with a reason for why an unexpected 
event might occur, their surprise is lower than when they are 
simply presented with this event on its own. 
The mean surprise ratings for each of the four conditions 
are displayed in Table 1. A one-way ANOVA, repeated 
measures revealed a significant difference in these ratings 
across conditions, both by participants, F1(3,153) = 134.401, 
p < 0.0001, MSe = .858, and by materials, F2(3,45) = 107.801,  
p < 0.0001, MSe = .331. Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni 
adjustments (all ps < 0.0083) showed that surprise ratings for 
the C condition (M = 1.88, SD = 1.38) were significantly 
lower than the ratings in the other three conditions. This 
finding is intuitive, as outcomes that are consistent with 
expectations will inevitably be judged as less surprising than 
those that run contrary to expectations. The surprise ratings 
for D (M = 4.95, SD = 1.77) and D+control (M = 5.04, SD = 
1.74) were not significantly different, which demonstrates 
that the addition of an irrelevant event had no effect on 
perceived surprise. However, ratings for the D+enable 
condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.72) were significantly lower than 
those for both the D and D+control conditions. This finding 
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 undermines the Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis, as it 
suggests that the same unexpected event will not always be 
judged as equally surprising. Participants provided with a 
rationale for why this unexpected event might occur were less 
surprised than participants presented with that unexpected 
event in isolation. This suggests that subjective surprise is 
based on the ease of representational integration rather than 
on factors such as probability or schema-discrepancy. 
In addition to the ANOVA we performed a trend analysis to 
ascertain if our predicted trend of C < D+enable < D held 
true. A Page’s L corroborated this trend across both 
participants, L(2) = 703.5, p< 0.0001, and materials, L(2) = 
220, p < 0.0001. This confirms that participants were more 
likely to rate events in the D+enable condition as less 
surprising than those in the D condition. In a further 
investigation, we divided participants’ surprise ratings into 
categories of low (1-2), medium (3-5) and high (6-7). We 
then performed a chi-square analysis to see if there was a 
relationship between surprise category and condition. The 
association between these measures was significant, χ2(6, N 
=832) = 370.931, p < 0.0001. Examination of the 
standardised residuals (set at +/- 2) revealed that participants 
were most likely to give a low surprise rating for C, a mid 
surprise rating for D+enable and a high surprise rating for D 
and D+control. 
In summary, this experiment has shown that surprise for an 
unexpected event is mitigated when a means for rationalising 
that surprise is made available. Although this effect was not 
great enough to lower surprise ratings to the base level of an 
expectation-confirming event, we have demonstrated that 
providing participants with a reason for a schema incongruent 
event can significantly attenuate their level of surprise.  
Experiment 2 
It is possible that the above results do not contradict the 
Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis. Another potential 
interpretation of the findings could be that participants 
reading scenarios in the D+enable condition were somehow 
altering their expectation for the outcome after reading the 
enabling event. This would explain why surprise ratings for 
the unexpected event were lower in this condition than they 
were when the disconfirming event was presented in isolation 
(as in D). For instance, participants reading the scenario in 
Table 1 should have expected the alarm clock to go off at the 
appointed time. However, when judging the possibility that 
“there was a power-cut during the night and the alarm clock 
failed to ring at 7am”, they may have based their surprise 
ratings for the unexpected outcome (“the alarm clock failed to 
ring”) in the context of the enabling event (“there was a 
power cut during the night”). In other words, participants 
might have viewed this enabling factor as a given and only 
rated surprise for the unexpected event in light of this. If this 
were true, the intended expectation would have been 
invalidated in the D+enable condition (i.e. given a power cut, 
a radio alarm clock is not likely to function). 
In the following experiment, we investigated this possibility 
with the aim of refuting the argument. If participants in 
Experiment 1 were really interpreting enabling events as part 
of the scenario and thereby altering their expectation, then 
presenting the enabling event within the scenario body should 
make no difference to perceived surprise. In opposition to this 
view, we assume that this manipulation should considerably 
alter surprise ratings for the unexpected outcome. That is, if 
the enabling event is portrayed within the scenario body, then 
it will be integrated into the reader’s representation from the 
onset. When asked to rate surprise for the ‘disconfirming’ 
event, ratings should be lower since supportive information 
for this event will be evident in the representation (i.e., when 
readers know that there has been a power-cut, they should not 
be surprised by the possibility that the alarm clock will fail to 
ring). In contrast, when the enabling event is presented as part 
of the hypothetical event sequence (as in the D+enable 
condition), surprise should be greater because that sequence 
will not be supported by the existing representation (i.e., the 
occurrence of a power-cut during the night and the alarm 
clock failing to ring still go against the expected sequence of 
events). 
 
Table 2: Sample scenario from Experiment 2. Participants all 
read scenario body and additional sentence where appropriate 
(these are shown in brackets within the scenario body).  
 
Scenario body 
Anna has a very important job interview in the morning. 
She has to get up far earlier than usual, so she makes sure 
to set her alarm clock radio for 7am. [There was a power-
cut during the night.*] [She had a quiet, good night’s 
sleep.**]      
*only presented in D(enable known) condition 
** only presented in D(control known) condition    
How surprised would you be if….? 
The alarm clock failed to ring at 7am 
D, D(enable known), D(control known) 
There was a power-cut during the night and the alarm clock 
failed to ring at 7am       
                                 D+enable 
 
In this experiment, we compared surprise ratings for the 
original D and D+enable conditions, along with a novel 
condition, D(enable known), in which the enabling event was 
presented within the scenario body. An appropriate control 
condition was also included which contained an irrelevant 
event in the scenario body, D(control known). For both of 
these conditions we wished to see how surprising participants 
would find the ‘disconfirming’ event on its own. This 
contrasts with the D+enable condition, where participants 
must rate surprise for the enabling event and the 
disconfirming event together. Table 2 displays a sample 
scenario elucidating these various conditions.  
The alternative account of the results from Experiment 1 
predicts the following ordering for the three disconfirming 
conditions: D+enable = D(enable known) < D. Conversely, 
the Representation-Fit account predicts that surprise ratings 
will differ across all three conditions, with the condition 
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 where the enabling factor is in the scenario body being the 
least surprising: D(enable known) < D+enable < D. 
Method 
Participants Fifty-seven undergraduate computer science 
students from University College Dublin voluntarily took part 
in this experiment. All were native English speakers. Data 
from two of these participants were discarded prior to 
analysis due to a failure to complete the experiment. 
 
Materials, Procedure & Design. The 16 event sequences 
from Experiment 1 were modified for the purposes of this 
experiment. Four versions of the scenarios were generated 
according to the four conditions as outlined above (see 
sample scenario in Table 2). The procedure and design were 
identical to those in Experiment 1. Each participant thus rated 
four scenarios from each condition. 
Results & Discussion 
The mean surprise ratings for the four conditions are 
displayed in Figure 1. These results are in line with our 
predictions, in that events in the D(enable known) condition 
were judged as the least surprising (M = 3.58, SD = 1.85), 
followed by those in the D+enable condition (M = 4.19, SD = 
1.62), and lastly by those in the D (M = 4.91, SD = 1.68) and 
D(control known) conditions (M = 4.99, SD = 1.68). A one-
way ANOVA, repeated measures revealed a significant 
difference in surprise ratings across these conditions, both by 
participants, F1(3,162) = 38.125, p < 0.0001, MSe = .638, and 
by materials, F2(3,45) = 19.802,  p < 0.0001, MSe = .364. 
Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni adjustments (all ps < 
0.0083) showed that surprise ratings for the D(enable known) 
condition were significantly lower than the ratings in the 
other three conditions. As predicted by the Representation-Fit 
theory, these results clearly demonstrate that when the 
enabling event forms part of the existing representation, 
surprise is lower. The results also undermine the possibility 
that participants’ expectations were influenced by the 
enabling event in the D+enable condition, since items in this 
condition were rated as reliably more surprising than those in 
the D(enable known) condition. However, ratings for the 
D+enable condition were significantly lower than those in the 
D and the D(control known) conditions which replicates the 
findings from Experiment 1. This reinforces the claim that the 
inclusion of an enabling factor decreases surprise for a 
disconfirming event. The D(control known) condition was not 
reliably different to its matching D condition. 
A Page’s L confirmed the trend in surprise ratings predicted 
by the Representation-Fit account of D(enable known) < 
D+enable < D, across participants, L(2) = 728.5, p < 0.0001, 
and materials, L(2) = 216, p < 0.0001. A chi-square analysis 
examining the frequencies of the surprise rating categories 
(low, medium and high) within the four conditions was also 
significant, χ2(6, N = 873) = 105.038, p < 0.0001. 
Standardised residuals revealed that participants were most 
likely to give a low surprise rating for scenarios in the 
D(enable known) condition, a mid surprise rating for those in 
the D+enable condition and a high surprise rating for the D 
and D(control known) conditions. 
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In sum, the results of this experiment are consistent with 
those of Experiment 1 and vindicate our original experimental 
paradigm by showing that the availability of explanatory 
factors for a surprising event can greatly facilitate 
representational integration. This again indicates that the 
assessment of surprise involves more than mere expectation-
disconfirmation or schema discrepancy. 
General Discussion 
In this paper we have investigated the claim that 
disconfirmed expectations, or schema-discrepant events, lead 
to a consistently high level of surprise (e.g. Meyer et al, 
1997; Teigen & Keren, 2003). While this is an appealing 
theory, results from two novel experiments suggest that the 
ease of integration, or what we have termed Representation-
Fit, may offer a more accurate perspective from which to 
consider this phenomenon. These experiments showed that 
people will judge an unexpected event as less surprising 
when a potential enabling factor for that event is made 
available. This effect can be observed even when events 
deviate significantly from a dominant schema by conflicting 
strongly with an expected sequence of events. In this section, 
we will discuss the implications of these results for our 
understanding of surprise, before outlining a cognitive model 
designed to explain the phenomenon. 
An important motivation for these experiments was to see 
whether the experience of surprise could be related to that of 
expectation. These two concepts are frequently used 
interchangeably but they may not be analogous (see Grimes-
Maguire & Keane, 2005a, 2005b). While our theory of 
Representation-Fit does not see surprise as being dependent 
on a person’s level of expectation, this variable can obviously 
play a role in surprise judgements. Evidently for example, if a 
certain outcome is expected, that event will be effortlessly 
integrated into a person’s representation and will 
consequently be perceived as very unsurprising. However, as 
we have shown here, if an event goes against an expectation, 
surprise can be lowered if some rationalisation for that event 
Figure 1: Mean surprise ratings for the conditions in Exp 2
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 is either provided or detected. By this token, an unexpected 
event should no longer seem so surprising when the reasons 
for it are understood. It is not clear whether theories such as 
that proposed by Meyer et al (1997) can adequately explain 
this effect.  
At first glance, the results of our experiments bear much 
resemblance to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) notion of 
representativeness, which is the idea that two events will 
appear more likely than one event on its own if those two 
events are perceived to be more representative of some norm. 
However, we have already mentioned that surprise cannot 
simply be defined as a function of such subjective 
probabilities since it is a retrospective judgement rather than 
an estimation of likelihood. Teigen and Keren (2003) also 
demonstrated that these two variables often yield differential 
judgements by people. In light of this, while Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) found that event sequences appear more 
probable when they converge on the norm, we claim that 
event sequences seem less surprising when people are 
presented with a means of adjusting their norm.  
Cognitive model of surprise judgements 
Maguire, Costello and Keane (2006) have devised a model of 
surprise judgements that is in line with the theory of 
Representation-Fit. Sharing some similarities with a model of 
plausibility judgements proposed by Connell and Keane 
(2006), the computational instantiation of our theory outputs 
a surprise rating for the final event in a number of short 
scenarios by means of two distinct phases. Firstly, the 
Integration phase entails building a coherent representation 
of the scenario. During this phase, the objective is to integrate 
any incoming events into the discourse representation in the 
easiest way possible. The Analysis phase follows when the 
model assesses level of surprise for a particular event. This is 
done by ascertaining the degree of representation-fit between 
the outcome and the events in the prior discourse 
representation. Recent simulations have revealed a strong 
correspondence between human data and outputted surprise 
ratings. One important assumption of the model has been 
supported by the current experiments – that people actively 
search for consistent information or enabling factors when 
assessing surprise for a certain event.  
Conclusion 
Despite being a subject of investigation for some time, there 
is still much to be discovered about the cognitive basis of 
surprise. In this article, we have demonstrated that subjective 
surprise is not a straightforward function of the degree of 
contrast between an observed and an expected outcome. We 
have illustrated that it is not the extent of schema discrepancy 
which determines the level of surprise, but rather the ease 
with which the discrepant event can be rationalised and 
subsequently integrated into the discourse representation. 
Existing theories of surprise may need to be refined to 
acknowledge this representational influence. 
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